"A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch. A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world."
-Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipus
Hamm: Go and get two bicycle-wheels.
-Deleuze & Guattari, Anti-Oedipus
Hamm: Go and get two bicycle-wheels.
Clov: There are no more bicycle-wheels.
Hamm: What have you done with your bicycle?
Clov: I never had a bicycle.
Hamm: The thing is impossible.
-Samuel Beckett, Endgame
How is it that Beckett’s characters seem to both be in-the-world and outside-the-world at the same time? Like the schizophrenic out for a leisurely bicycle ride, or a the neurotic recumbent on Freud’s couch reclaiming the Oedipal-I, Beckett’s characters live along a line between the inside and the outside, astride the grave.
(They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more)
-Waiting For Godot
Perhaps Beckett’s characters, all to a one, live along the line of least/most résistance, astride the epoche, awaiting the punter’s cry, Charon, dearest Charon we beckon thee.
Perhaps a conjuration can be found in Husserl’s phenomenological epoché. If my understanding of the world is bound (constrained, bracketted) by my reflection on the world of experiences, my experience of the world, the question arises as to the objectification of the world, my experience of the world. Casting aside the argument for solipsism, a self-reflective experience of the world is a subjective ‘I’ experience of the world. True, the ‘I’ is in the world, engaging in the world of ‘things’, but self-reflectively so. If the ‘I’ experience of the world is a self-reflective experience of the world, a ‘being-in-the-world’ at or within the self-reflective ‘I’, then the constancy of the world, the ‘I’-reflective world, is dependant on my ‘being-in-the-world as ‘I’. Time, therefore, is that/this ‘moment-in-the-word’, an ‘I’ self-reflection of the world. This is where, at which point, Husserl’s phenomenological epoché comes into play.
-Samuel Beckett, Endgame
How is it that Beckett’s characters seem to both be in-the-world and outside-the-world at the same time? Like the schizophrenic out for a leisurely bicycle ride, or a the neurotic recumbent on Freud’s couch reclaiming the Oedipal-I, Beckett’s characters live along a line between the inside and the outside, astride the grave.
(They give birth astride of a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more)
-Waiting For Godot
Perhaps Beckett’s characters, all to a one, live along the line of least/most résistance, astride the epoche, awaiting the punter’s cry, Charon, dearest Charon we beckon thee.
Perhaps a conjuration can be found in Husserl’s phenomenological epoché. If my understanding of the world is bound (constrained, bracketted) by my reflection on the world of experiences, my experience of the world, the question arises as to the objectification of the world, my experience of the world. Casting aside the argument for solipsism, a self-reflective experience of the world is a subjective ‘I’ experience of the world. True, the ‘I’ is in the world, engaging in the world of ‘things’, but self-reflectively so. If the ‘I’ experience of the world is a self-reflective experience of the world, a ‘being-in-the-world’ at or within the self-reflective ‘I’, then the constancy of the world, the ‘I’-reflective world, is dependant on my ‘being-in-the-world as ‘I’. Time, therefore, is that/this ‘moment-in-the-word’, an ‘I’ self-reflection of the world. This is where, at which point, Husserl’s phenomenological epoché comes into play.
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