Aesth-ethics
Something tastes good; I savor it in my mouth. I read a good book; the words, catches of phrases, characters and narrative entertain me. I see a painting by Caravaggio and I feel drowned it it’s beauty, colours, textures and light. I watch the news on television and see a tall, attractive politician with a full mane of hair and a well-tailored Armani suit; I think, yes, he must be a ‘good’ politician with upstanding moral intentions. I am walking to work and I see a shabby, disheveled man hunched in a doorway, a homeless person begging for spare change and a cigarette; I think, he must be weak, an alcoholic, someone lacking in goodness and moral virtues. An over weight, straggly haired woman approaches me and politely asks for a cigarette; I say no, I have none to spare, and give her a dismissing look. Moments later, an attractive, tall woman with long blond hair dressed in a light summer skirt asks me for a cigarette; I smile, and fumble to offer her not one, but two cigarettes.
What is good is beautiful, pleasing to the eye, to the ear and to the tongue. The good is virtuous and meaningful; it has autonomy and purpose; it is useful and covetous. Good is beautiful; what is beautiful is desirous; what is desired must be good; what is good and beautiful and desirous, is useful and purposeful. All things fat and straggly, those without a home or a clean pair of trousers, those condemned to the ninth canticle of Dante’s Inferno, they are un-desirous, meaningless, lacking in purpose and usefulness; they have no autonomy, no reason. They are valueless; they are lacking in value, in beauty and goodness. If they have no autonomy, if I ascribe to them no meaning, no purpose, no virtue or reason, they are meaningless, ugly, not beautiful, and therefore not good.
Beauty is the absence of ugly; virtue is the absence of not virtue; good is the absence of bad (ness); ugliness is the absence of beauty (full); not virtue is the absence of virtue (ous); badness is the absence of good (ness). What is good is beautiful; what is beautiful and good is desirous; what is desirous and good and beautiful is virtuous. What is none of these, has none of these, is ugly, non-virtuous, bad, not good and un-desirous. I covet only that which I desire; I desire goodness and beauty, not ugliness and badness. If an ugly person, a non-person, a non-person without autonomy, which I either ascribe to him or her, or deny, has something beautiful and good that I covet, something I desire, I shift my ascription of what is good, beautiful and desirous, in order to obtain that which I covet. This shift, or shifting, creates a vacuum where the good and beautiful, and the bad and ugly, are juxtaposition (ed), inverted, in order that I can desire what I covet, and covet what I desire. In this manner a meta, or false good is introduced, one that allows me to ascribe goodness and beauty to something which has neither, but is ugly, bad and lacking in autonomy (which I ascribe or withhold) and therefore un-desirous.
However, in order to obtain what I covet, which is desirous, being good, beautiful and virtuous, I invert or juxtaposition the one for the other, thereby creating a falseness that allows for the obtainment of that which I ascribe with beauty and goodness and virtue. It is an ascription of convenience; meaning, I ascribe, or attribute to that which I see as ugly and bad, without virtue and goodness, goodness and beauty and virtue, in order to obtain that which I desire and covet as beautiful, good and virtuous. This is what I would call a ‘lie of convenience’, the ascription of attributes of virtue, goodness and beauty, to something or person that I have withheld these attributes from, in order to obtain that which I see as beautiful, good and virtuous; a means to an end through a simple juxtaposition, or inverse of attributions. A meta or false attribution of good, beauty and virtue; a lie of convenience in order to obtain that which I see, and have ascribed with, or attributed to, beauty, goodness and, above all, virtue. Beauty and goodness are virtuous, therefore desirous and to be coveted. What is beautiful and good, and therefore virtuous, is not a priori or given, but rather a false or meta ascription of attributes that allow me to obtain that which I deem desirous and to be coveted.
A shabby, disheveled homeless man hunched up in a doorway, has beauty, goodness and, above all, virtue, if he has something that I desire and covet; a cigarette, for example, or something I deem beautiful and good, like a painting by Caravaggio, or, a cigarette. What is beautiful, good and virtuous, is what I desire, not that which I do not. A cigarette is virtuous, beautiful and, above all, good, when I desire or covet it; meaning, when I have none. A fat, scraggly woman who has cigarettes, which I covet and desire, as I have none, is virtuous, good and beautiful as a means to obtaining that which I have not and desire and covet. She remains fat and scraggly, to be dismissed and ignored, when I have a cigarette; meaning, she is what I ascribe to her, out of connivance, in order to obtain that which I lack, or don’t have, that which I desire and covet. The attribution of beauty, good and virtue, are means to ends, means to obtain that which I desire and covet, having not that which I lack. A simple inversion, or juxtaposition, serves me well; it allows me to falsely ascribe, or attribute to that which I deem covetous and desirous, beauty, goodness and, above all, virtue.
The Savant’s Imagination
What is good is beautiful, pleasing to the eye, to the ear and to the tongue. The good is virtuous and meaningful; it has autonomy and purpose; it is useful and covetous. Good is beautiful; what is beautiful is desirous; what is desired must be good; what is good and beautiful and desirous, is useful and purposeful. All things fat and straggly, those without a home or a clean pair of trousers, those condemned to the ninth canticle of Dante’s Inferno, they are un-desirous, meaningless, lacking in purpose and usefulness; they have no autonomy, no reason. They are valueless; they are lacking in value, in beauty and goodness. If they have no autonomy, if I ascribe to them no meaning, no purpose, no virtue or reason, they are meaningless, ugly, not beautiful, and therefore not good.
Beauty is the absence of ugly; virtue is the absence of not virtue; good is the absence of bad (ness); ugliness is the absence of beauty (full); not virtue is the absence of virtue (ous); badness is the absence of good (ness). What is good is beautiful; what is beautiful and good is desirous; what is desirous and good and beautiful is virtuous. What is none of these, has none of these, is ugly, non-virtuous, bad, not good and un-desirous. I covet only that which I desire; I desire goodness and beauty, not ugliness and badness. If an ugly person, a non-person, a non-person without autonomy, which I either ascribe to him or her, or deny, has something beautiful and good that I covet, something I desire, I shift my ascription of what is good, beautiful and desirous, in order to obtain that which I covet. This shift, or shifting, creates a vacuum where the good and beautiful, and the bad and ugly, are juxtaposition (ed), inverted, in order that I can desire what I covet, and covet what I desire. In this manner a meta, or false good is introduced, one that allows me to ascribe goodness and beauty to something which has neither, but is ugly, bad and lacking in autonomy (which I ascribe or withhold) and therefore un-desirous.
However, in order to obtain what I covet, which is desirous, being good, beautiful and virtuous, I invert or juxtaposition the one for the other, thereby creating a falseness that allows for the obtainment of that which I ascribe with beauty and goodness and virtue. It is an ascription of convenience; meaning, I ascribe, or attribute to that which I see as ugly and bad, without virtue and goodness, goodness and beauty and virtue, in order to obtain that which I desire and covet as beautiful, good and virtuous. This is what I would call a ‘lie of convenience’, the ascription of attributes of virtue, goodness and beauty, to something or person that I have withheld these attributes from, in order to obtain that which I see as beautiful, good and virtuous; a means to an end through a simple juxtaposition, or inverse of attributions. A meta or false attribution of good, beauty and virtue; a lie of convenience in order to obtain that which I see, and have ascribed with, or attributed to, beauty, goodness and, above all, virtue. Beauty and goodness are virtuous, therefore desirous and to be coveted. What is beautiful and good, and therefore virtuous, is not a priori or given, but rather a false or meta ascription of attributes that allow me to obtain that which I deem desirous and to be coveted.
A shabby, disheveled homeless man hunched up in a doorway, has beauty, goodness and, above all, virtue, if he has something that I desire and covet; a cigarette, for example, or something I deem beautiful and good, like a painting by Caravaggio, or, a cigarette. What is beautiful, good and virtuous, is what I desire, not that which I do not. A cigarette is virtuous, beautiful and, above all, good, when I desire or covet it; meaning, when I have none. A fat, scraggly woman who has cigarettes, which I covet and desire, as I have none, is virtuous, good and beautiful as a means to obtaining that which I have not and desire and covet. She remains fat and scraggly, to be dismissed and ignored, when I have a cigarette; meaning, she is what I ascribe to her, out of connivance, in order to obtain that which I lack, or don’t have, that which I desire and covet. The attribution of beauty, good and virtue, are means to ends, means to obtain that which I desire and covet, having not that which I lack. A simple inversion, or juxtaposition, serves me well; it allows me to falsely ascribe, or attribute to that which I deem covetous and desirous, beauty, goodness and, above all, virtue.
The Savant’s Imagination
Something is not right, the savant’s imagination that is forever at odds with the possibility of the other. This philosophical premonition that whatever it is or is not be the case (we have Wittgenstein to thank for that) language will always be the only way in and out of the other. There is no other way, no other passage in or out. This paucity of thought, this wound not yet scabbed over, is the result of too much analysis, word-salad, a wound that makes the victim a victim of language. The wound cauterized by thought then tossed wholesale into the dustbin of uselessness; this trivial moment of thought has no final exit or retreat (we have Sartre to thank for that).
Matters less what you think than the manner in which you think you think (we have Kant to thank for that). Deleuze was inside yet always had a perspective given from the outside. Deleuze was so entrenched and mitigated from the inside that the outside was too painful and repugnant to contain in one man’s thoughts. The dirty little secret that keeps the Oxon. Moralists busy calculating and ritualizing ad nausea, and then some. That which in the end is too belly-swollen to be contained is uncontainable, beyond containment. This perspicuous eye that sees behind the containment (of thought) that never sees anything other than the other that it contains. That, in the end, is what kills a man. A man takes his own life when containment is all that is possible, when there are no multiplicities, only lacuna and moderation.
That which is built upon the scaffolding of thought is all that language allows us to see. Milky eyes always ruminate upon those things and objects and thoughts and patterns of thought that have ways out, they never see the inside from the outside as Deleuze did. There is always apprehension hidden behind the postmortem. The other will never be found other than in language, which we control and subjugate, for selfish needs. I suggest a joyous Nietzschean premortem, a joyous Deleuzian canonical ass-fuck
Matters less what you think than the manner in which you think you think (we have Kant to thank for that). Deleuze was inside yet always had a perspective given from the outside. Deleuze was so entrenched and mitigated from the inside that the outside was too painful and repugnant to contain in one man’s thoughts. The dirty little secret that keeps the Oxon. Moralists busy calculating and ritualizing ad nausea, and then some. That which in the end is too belly-swollen to be contained is uncontainable, beyond containment. This perspicuous eye that sees behind the containment (of thought) that never sees anything other than the other that it contains. That, in the end, is what kills a man. A man takes his own life when containment is all that is possible, when there are no multiplicities, only lacuna and moderation.
That which is built upon the scaffolding of thought is all that language allows us to see. Milky eyes always ruminate upon those things and objects and thoughts and patterns of thought that have ways out, they never see the inside from the outside as Deleuze did. There is always apprehension hidden behind the postmortem. The other will never be found other than in language, which we control and subjugate, for selfish needs. I suggest a joyous Nietzschean premortem, a joyous Deleuzian canonical ass-fuck
1 comment:
very nice post. Vivid
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